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Ethical Problems of an International
Human Rights Law Practice
David Weissbrodt*
Little attention has been devoted to ethical problems facing American lawyers
engaged in commercial and corporate work in foreign countries or with foreign
clients. I Even less attention has been paid to the professional responsibilities of
lawyers engaged in an international human rights legal practice. 2 As an increas-
ing number of lawyers become involved in the practice of international human
rights law in the courts of the United States, in international fora, and abroad,
issues will continue to arise regarding the ethical constraints on their work.3
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. A.B. 1966, Columbia
University; J.D. 1969, University of California Law School, Berkeley. Professor Weissbrodt regularly
represents nongovernmental organizations in the sessions of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minor-
ities. -eds.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to David Orbuch for his assistance in preparing this
article and Nanci Smith for her untiring secretarial help.
1. For one of the few articles dealing with this issue, see Goebel, Professional Responsibility Issues
in International Law Practice, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1981).
2. The responsibility of decision makers in international tribunals to be impartial has been the
subject of some commentary. See, e.g., T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 216-29 (1982); Cema, Book Review, 8 HUM. RTs. INTERNET
REP. 243, 247 (1982-83) (reviewing T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra); Franck &
Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 308, 313-15 (1980). The major texts on professional responsibility appear to give no
attention to the problems of international human rights lawyers. See, e.g., R. ARONSON & D.
WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A NUTSHELL (1980); LEGAL-MEDICAL STUDIES
INC., PRACTICAL ISSUES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1984); R.
MATHEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1974); T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed. 1984); M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed. 1976).
3. A few U.S. lawyers work for international, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organiza-
tions such as Americas Watch, Amnesty International, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, the International Human Rights Law Group, the International Labor
Organization, the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, and the United Nations
Center for Human Rights. See generally Weissbrodt, The Contribution of International Nongovern-
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This article focuses on a few of the ethical dilemmas facing U.S. lawyers who
practice international human rights law. 4 It identifies a few troublesome issues,
suggests some relevant principles for resolving them, and encourages others to
begin thinking about these and similar questions.
In assessing the problems identified below, this article examines two sources of
ethical constraint on U.S. lawyers practicing international human rights law: the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR or Model Code), which was
adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1969,1 and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which were adopted in 1983.6 Part I
establishes that these sources apply to the U.S. lawyer regardless of whether or
not the lawyer is in the United States and whether or not he is acting as an
attorney.
Attorneys who leave the countries where they practice law and travel to other
nations to observe trials of political or human rights interest 7 are free of the many
customary inhibitions which domestic lawyers may consciously or unconsciously
mental Organizations to the Protection of Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 403 (T. Meron ed. 1984) (describing the contributions of nongovernmental organizations to the
international protection of human rights); Landy, The Implementation Procedures of the International
Labor Organization, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633 (1980) (describing the development of human
rights procedures for the I.L.O.). In addition, many U.S. lawyers provide unpaid legal services for
the international nongovernmental organizations identified above and other international human rights
organizations.
4. In a previous article, the author explored some of the ethical issues faced by international human
rights organizations in choosing strategies to pursue their objectives. See Weissbrodt, Strategies for
the Selection and Pursuit of International Human Rights Objectives, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 62
(1981).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter cited as CPR]. Most states
have adopted some version of the Model Code. The Model Code is divided into three parts: canons,
disciplinary rules (DRs), and ethical considerations (ECs). The canons enunciate broad principles
which all lawyers are expected to follow. Id. at Preamble. The disciplinary rules mandate a minimum
level of conduct for lawyers. Id. Should an attorney's conduct fall below this minimum level he may
be subject to disbarment, suspension, or other sanction if so provided by state law. Ethical considera-
tions are aspirational objectives which lawyers strive to achieve. Id. Should a lawyer fail to abide by
ethical considerations, there are no sanctions.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES]. The
Model Rules were proposed as a replacement for the Model Code. The drafting committee concluded
that ethical considerations should no longer be merely aspirational goals. Hence, the Model Rules
abandon the distinction between ethical considerations and disciplinary rules in favor of a single set of
rules. Some Model Rules, however, state obligations while others state only that lawyers ought to
follow certain principles. Accordingly, the new Model Rules consolidate the old CPR but do not
entirely remove the distinction between obligations and ethical principles. The Rules have not yet met
with broad approval among the states.
The text of this article frequently focuses on the CPR with footnote references to the Model Rules,
particularly where the two documents contain similar language.
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the work of international trial observers, see Weissbrodt,
International Trial Observers, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 27 (1982).
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feel. Foreign observers may be freer to use their presence creatively to encourage
trial participants to pursue justice and fairness. However, international trial ob-
servers engage in a number of activities that raise ethical issues. Part II of the
article considers how these issues might be resolved under the CPR and the
Model Rules.
A second set of ethical issues revolves around the uncertainties involved in
zealously representing clients within the bounds of the law in international fora.
In order to be an effective advocate under some important international human
rights procedures, the attorney must obtain knowlege of information which is
supposed to be confidential under those procedures. The extent to which a
lawyer's responsibility to his client permits efforts to discover and to use this
information once obtained is not clear. For example, under the widely-discussed
United Nations (UN) human rights procedure set forth in Economic and Social
Council Resolution 1503 (ECOSOC 1503 or Resolution 1503)8 all actions under-
taken by UN bodies in response to communications alleging consistent patterns
of gross violations of human rights must be kept confidential. 9 Nevertheless,
anyone who cares to learn what has happened to a client's communication can do
so and the status of any particular communication is known to a large number of
advocates and interested observers. 10 Still, the law and some aspects of the
procedures under ECOSOC 1503 are at least formally secret. Part III analyzes a
U.S. lawyer's responsibilities under the Model Code and Model Rules when
confronted with this situation.
A third problem for international human rights lawyers is one which raises
ethical issues for all litigators who think strategically about the development of
law in their area of interest. International human rights law has only begun to
evolve. As a result, advocates who propose to sue based on international human
rights law in U.S. courts or international fora should not do so without consider-
ing the impact of their proposed activities upon the development of the law and
institutions they wish to use. Even when a client wishes to appeal, an attorney
may wish to consider these issues. Part IV focuses on a U.S. lawyer's respon-
sibilities in this situation and the guidance provided by the Model Code and the
Model Rules.
8. E.S.C. res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.l (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Resolution 1503]. For a detailed discussion of Resolution 1503, see T. ZUiJD-
WIJK, PETITIONING THE UNITED NATIONS 25-116 (1982).
9. Resolution 1503, supra note 8, at paras. 7(c), 8.
10. Similar problems arise in regard to other international human rights procedures. For example,
under the UNESCO procedure for dealing with communications concerning the exercise of human
rights by artists, educators, and others within UNESCO's mandate, complainants regularly receive
responses which are stamped "confidential" even though there is no specific authority for this
practice. See UNESCO Doc. 104 EX/Dec. 3.3 (1978). See generally Marks, The Complaint Pro-
cedure of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 94 (H. Hannum ed. 1984).
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I. EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
There are several broad provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that imply that the ethical standards
imposed by these codes apply to an attorney regardless of where he is and
whether he is acting as an attorney. Although the CPR does not explicitly address
this issue, Disciplinary Rule 1-102, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
illegal conduct, contains no geographical limitation, and does not purport to
apply only when a lawyer is acting as a lawyer. DR 1-102 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law. "
The phrase "any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law" seems designed to reach conduct outside the scope of activity as a lawyer.
The Comment to Rule 8.5 of the Model Rules states more explicitly that attor-
neys "remain subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction in which they
are licensed to practice" even when they are outside of the United States.'"
The few cases which have considered the issue agree that one need not be
acting as an attorney to be governed by the CPR. '3 One well-known example is
found in In re Nixon. ' 4 Mr. Nixon, while President of the United States, was
alleged to have obstructed improperly an FBI investigation of unlawful entry into
the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee. The State of New York
instituted proceedings to discipline Nixon, but he failed to answer, appear, or file
any papers on his behalf. The court nevertheless disbarred Nixon, stating:
11. CPR DR 1-102. The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 8.4. It states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. ...
MODEL RULES Rule 8.4.
12. MODEL RULES Rule 8.5 comment.
13. But cf. Segretti v. State Bar of Cal., 15 Cal. 3d 878, 888, 544 P2d 929, 934, 126 Cal. Rptr.
793, 798 (1976) (suggesting that the fact that misconduct was not committed in the capacity as an
attorney may be a mitigating factor in determining punishment).
14. In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1976).
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We note that while Mr. Nixon was holding public office he was not acting in his
capacity as an attorney. However, the power of the Court to discipline an attorney
extends to misconduct other than professional malfeasance when such conduct
reflects adversely upon the legal profession and is not in accordance with the high
standards imposed upon members of the Bar. 15
Other, less notorious cases reach the same result. In one case, an attorney's
license was revoked for willfully and knowingly attempting to evade payment of
taxes by filing false and fraudulent tax returns. 16 The court, finding that such
conduct involved moral turpitude, stated: "We also reject any suggestion that
misconduct of an attorney which is not connected with his professional activities
or does not impair his ability to represent clients affords no basis for disciplinary
action." 17 In another case, the court held that if a lawyer engages in business and
wishes to remain a member of the bar, he must conduct himself in that business in
accordance with the standards imposed on members of the bar. 's A third case
held that an attorney cannot evade his responsibility to the court, bar, or public by
asserting that he was performing services which could lawfully be performed by
a non-lawyer. ' 9 Hence, the case law makes it clear that an attorney need not be
acting as an attorney to trigger the applicability of the CPR.
That same case law is less explicit with respect to whether there are any
geographical limitations on the applicability of the CPR. In the Nixon case, there
was no mention of the fact that the alleged misconduct took place in Washington,
D.C. and not New York, where Nixon was a member of the bar. 20 The court
assumed that New York had the power to disbar a member of its bar for violations
of the CPR which occurred in Washington, D.C.
The approach of the New York court in Nixon is closely paralleled by that of
the California Supreme Court in Segretti v. State Bar of California.2 Segretti
also participated in the Watergate improprieties. He wrote bogus letters on the
stationery of Senators Humphrey, Muskie, and McCarthy. 22 The letters contained
false statements, including charges that Senators Humphrey and Jackson were
engaging in sexual misconduct, that Shirley Chisholm was mentally ill, and that
McCarthy and Chisholm wanted their delegates to switch their votes to
Humphrey. 23 These letters must have been composed outside the State of Califor-
15. Id. at 181-82, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (citations omitted).
16. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 509 S.W.2d 294
(1974).
17. Id. at 1107, 509 S.W.2d at 295.
18. In re Madera, 39 A.D.2d 202, 205, 333 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865
(1973).
19. State v. Mayes, 216 Kan. 38, 42, 531 P.2d 102, 105 (1975).
20. See 53 A.D.2d at 179-80, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
21. Segretti v. State Bar of Cal., 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976).
22. Id. at 883, 544 P.2d at 931, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
23. Id. at 884, 544 P.2d at 931, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
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nia, but the court made no geographical references. The court simply stated that
Segretti's acts involved moral turpitude as well as deceit and suspended his
California license for two years.
2 4
One case does directly address the issue. In In re Scallen, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held that the CPR regulates the conduct of a lawyer "anywhere in
the world." ' 25 The court upheld the suspension of Scallen based on a Canadian
criminal conviction for securities fraud. It concluded that if the foreign trial
accorded the defendant fundamental fairness and due process, the foreign con-
viction should be admitted in U.S. proceedings as proof of the underlying facts. 26
Scallen does not consider whether a U.S. attorney could be disciplined for
criminal acts carried out, but not punished, outside the United States. Nor does it
consider whether an attorney could be disciplined in the United States for acts
carried out in foreign countries which violate civil as opposed to criminal laws.
Nevertheless, cautious attorneys should probably assume that the CPR does
apply to their conduct abroad. The remainder of this article presumes that the
CPR does so apply.
When U.S. human rights lawyers are acting in a distant jurisdiction, they are
unlikely to be the subject of ethics complaints brought pursuant to the CPR or
Model Rules. The foreigners whom U.S. lawyers encounter may be uncertain as
to which ethical principles apply, and they may be unaware of the procedures for
bringing a complaint in the United States. In addition, it would be difficult
politically for a government which is committing human rights abuses against its
citizens to assert convincingly an ethics complaint against a lawyer who has
sought to bring world attention to these abuses.
Furthermore, some scholars who have considered the ethical constraints on
U.S. lawyers working abroad indicate that there may be situations where formal
rules such as the CPR and the Model Rules conflict with higher notions of ethics
and should be ignored. 27 Roger Goebel argues that although a lawyer's decision
to violate the formal rules is ultimately a personal one, issues of political opinion
and public policy invariably come into play when a lawyer is confronted with
such a decision.28 While public policy considerations may be relevant to an
understanding of the oppressive nature of a foreign regime, the U.S. lawyer
should not ignore the CPR and the Model Rules and rely solely on his sense of
public opinion. The human rights lawyer, particularly one with little experience,
can benefit from the guidance of the CPR and the Model Rules. While these
codes do not directly address the problems of international human rights lawyers,
they do provide general and sometimes specific guidelines as to what is, and what
ought to be, permissible.
24. See id. at 887-92, 544 P.2d at 934-36, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 798-800.
25. In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn. 1978).
26. Id. at 840.
27. See Goebel, supra note I, at 43-45.
28. Id. at 45.
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II. ETHICAL ISSUES FOR ATrORNEY OBSERVERS
In recent years, many U.S. lawyers have served as international trial observ-
ers. Indeed, the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section of the ABA
recently initiated a program of sending distinguished U.S. lawyers to trials
abroad. 29 The first trial placed under scrutiny by the ABA observers occurred
during 1984 in Yugoslavia. Other U.S. lawyers have been sent abroad by Am-
nesty International, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the International Asso-
ciation of Democratic Lawyers, the International Commission of Jurists, the
International Human Rights Law Group, the Lawyers Committee for Interna-
tional Human Rights, the Lutheran World Federation, the Minnesota Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee, the National Conference of Black Law-
yers, and the U.S. Department of State. These lawyers have attended trials in
such diverse countries as Angola, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South
Africa, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Spain, Sri Lanka, the Republic of
China (Taiwan), and the United Kingdom.30
Foreign attorneys have conversely attended trials on behalf of international
human rights organizations in the United States. These international observers
have attended criminal trials and post-conviction proceedings in California, New
York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 3
International trial observers serve several purposes. First, they gather facts
firsthand and prepare impartial, independent, and objective reports. Second, the
participants in trials-particularly the judges and prosecutors-are likely to be
more circumspect in the face of trial observers who can authoritatively and
independently criticize the fairness of the proceedings. Third, observers give the
defendant and the defendant's supporters a sense of international assistance and
thus bolster their confidence. Fourth, the presence of an observer sent by an
organization or government demonstrates the sending party's concern about the
fairness of the proceedings to all of the participants in the trial.3 2
Only a handful of observers have considered the ethical constraints on their
work 33 and it is doubtful that any code of legal ethics contains a single reference
29. See Lawyers Comm. on Int'l Human Rights, Draft Proposal for an ABA International Trial
Observer Project (1982) (unpublished memorandum available in the Human Rights Library, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School).
30. See International Trial Observer Missions 1949-80, at 101-07 (listing the nationality of trial
observers and the frequency of observation by organizations in individual countries) (unpublished
statistical summary of notes and reports available in the Human Rights Library, University of Min-
nesota Law School).
31. See id. at 140-42.
32. See Weissbrodt, supra note 7, at 59.
33. For example, Michael Williams, an observer who was himself an English judge, indicated in
an interview with the author in June 1978 that ethical considerations made him reluctant to discuss the
case with the judge in the Egyptian trial he observed.
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to the conduct of international trial observers. The U.S. attorney acting as a trial
observer who considers ethical constraints may wonder if the normal ethical
precepts followed in the U.S. are applicable to attorney observers visiting foreign
countries. Part I demonstrated that the CPR and Model Rules do apply to U.S.
lawyers abroad. The following section examines some specific questions faced
by international trial observers and suggests the answers required by the CPR and
Model Rules.
A. Interviewing the Jurors About the Case
A few observers have sought and obtained interviews with members of the jury
in criminal cases they have observed. 4 Canon 7 of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility addresses issues of trial conduct, and in particular, commu-
nication with jurors. The rule pertaining to communication with jurors, DR
7-108(B), is quite specific. It states:
During the trial of a case:
(I) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to
communicate with any member of the jury.
(2) A lawyer who is not connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause
another to communicate with a juror concerning the case.
35
An attorney trial observer surely falls within the broad category of lawyers who
are not connected with the observed case. Because the rule explicitly includes the
activities of lawyers not officially connected with the parties, it would clearly be
unethical for an attorney trial observer to interview the jurors during the trial of
the case. A trial observer could, however, within the constraints of the Model
Code, communicate with jurors concerning the case after it was concluded as
long as she did not attempt to harass or embarrass the jurors. 3 6
B. Interviewing the Judge About the Case
Most trial observers seek to interview the judge of any trial they observe.37 The
provision regulating this issue is DR 7-110(B). It states:
34. See Weissbrodt, supra note 7, at 89 (based on an interview with J. Luthi in Geneva on Sept. 7,
1978 concerning his observation of the Valpreda trial in Rome).
35. CPR DR 7-108(B) (emphasis added). The analogous provision in the Model Rules states:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) Seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective or other official by means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law; or
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.5.
36. CPR DR 7-108(D).
37. See Weissbrodt, supra note 7, at 87-89, 118.
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In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another to
communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before whom
the proceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to
the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he is
not represented by a lawyer.
(4) As otherwise authorized by law, or by Section A(4) under Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. 
38
The phrase "in an adversary proceeding, a lawyer" can be read narrowly to
apply only to lawyers who represent a party in an adversary proceeding, or
broadly to apply to any lawyer present at an adversary proceeding.
The subsections Of DR 7-110(B) indicate that the narrow reading should be
preferred. Subsection (1) refers to the "course of official proceedings." Nor-
mally, only an attorney who represents a party is allowed to speak to the judge on
the record. Observers generally do not participate in making the official record
and, therefore, do not appear to be included within the scope of the provision.
Subsections (2) and (3) allow written and oral communications with the judge
upon notice "to opposing counsel or to the adverse party." Attorneys cannot give
notice to "opposing counsel" or the "adverse party" unless they represent a
party to the proceeding. Because attorney observers do not represent parties to
the proceeding, this subsection also indicates that they are not covered by DR 7-
110(B).
A comparison of DR 7-110(B) with DR 7-108(B)(2),3 9 the provision on the
permissibility of juror interviews, also indicates that a narrow reading of DR
7-110(B) should be preferred. The drafters of the CPR could have included a
specific provision, as they did in DR 7-108(B)(2), stating that "a lawyer who is
not connected" with a case must comply with DR 7-110(B). The drafters did not
make DR 7-110(B) specifically applicable to lawyers not connected with a case,
and they are likely to have made that omission intentionally. Since jurors are lay
decision-makers, it makes sense to grant them more protection from outside
influences than professional judges.
Finally, a narrow reading of DR 7-110(B) is consistent with the principle of
freedom of expression, which is protected by the U.S. Constitution 4° and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 41 The first amendment
guarantees the lawyer the right to make public comment about any case for which
38. CPR DR 7-110(B) (emphasis added). The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 3.5.
See supra note 35.
39. See supra text accompanying note 34.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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she is not counsel of record. 42 By analogy, it would seem that a lawyer not
connected with a case should have the fundamental right to ask a judge about a
case. 43 The free speech interests of lawyers not counsel in a particular case may
explain the different language in DR 7-108(B)(2) and DR 7-110(B). The state's
interest in protecting lay jurors from outside influences arguably outweighs the
free speech interest of non-record attorneys. The free speech rights of non-record
attorneys, however, arguably outweigh the state's interest in protecting judges
from outside influences. The principle of free speech, together with a careful
reading of the CPR, indicate that it is best to read DR 7-110(B) narrowly. There-
fore, DR 7-110(B) most likely applies only to record counsel, and not to attorney
trial observers.
The Model Rules can also be read to permit attorney trial observers to inter-
view a judge about a case. Rule 3.5 states only that "[a] lawyer shall not...
communicate ex parte with such a person [judge, juror, or prospective juror]
except as permitted by law." 44 This Rule may be interpreted to mean that no
lawyer present at an adversary proceeding should communicate with a judge or
jury. The final clause, "except as permitted by law," may, however, allow trial
observers to communicate with a judge. Although there is no provision expressly
permitting trial observers to communicate with a judge, there is also no provision
prohibiting an international trial observer from communicating with a judge.
Therefore, like DR 7-110(B), Rule 3.5 most likely only applies to record counsel
and not to attorney trial observers.
Even if a broad interpretation of DR 7-110(B) and Model Rule 3.5 is adopted,
conversations with judges are not completely barred. A cautious attorney trial
observer could still interview a judge in several ways. First, pursuant to DR
7-1I0(B)(I), the observer could ask the judge for an interview during the official
proceedings. Although this method would probably not be permitted in U.S.
courts, it might accord with the procedures of a foreign judicial system. Second,
DR 7-110(B)(2) suggests that the observer may submit written questions to the
judge, allow the judge to answer in writing, and then deliver copies of the
writings to both parties to the proceeding. Third, DR 7-110(B)(3) suggests that
the observer may interview the judge orally, if she first notifies the record counsel
42. See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
43. But cf. In re Snyder, 734 E2d 334 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 4833'
(U.S. June 24, 1985). The Eighth Circuit in In re Snyder suspended an attorney from practicing in the
federal courts for six months because of a letter the attorney had written that was critical of the court's
administration of a repayment system for attorneys undertaking pro bono criminal defense work. The
letter was written to the district court judge's secretary. The court of appeals ruling was challenged on
first amendment grounds, but the Supreme Court, avoiding the constitutional question, ruled that the
attorney's conduct was not sufficiently "contemptuous" or "contumacious" to justify the suspension.
53 U.S.L.W. at 4837. For a criticism of the Eighth Circuit opinion in the case, see Rieger, Lawyers'
Criticism of Judges: Is Freedom of Speech a Figure of Speech?, 2 CoNrsT. COMMENTARY 69 (1985).
44. MODEL RULES Rule 3.5.
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and the parties and allows them to be present at the interview. Fourth, DR 7-
110(B)(4) and the Code of Judicial Conduct 45 indicate that ex parte communica-
tions are forbidden. This principle implies that interviews which include both
parties and their counsel are permitted. Of course, one strength of the present
trial observer system is the confidentiality of observers' reports. This confiden-
tiality would be destroyed if all parties were permitted to attend interviews
between observers and judges. Therefore, the narrow interpretation of DR
7-110(B), namely that it applies only to attorneys who represent a party of record,
is preferable.
Foreign observers attending a U.S. court trial should be aware of the problems
they may face in attempting to speak with a U.S. judge. The U.S. judge must
comply with section A(4) of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or
his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law,
neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending
or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disin-
terested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to
the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the
parties reasonable opportunity to respond.) 6
The first sentence of section A(4) directs the judge to accord every person who is
legally interested in a proceeding the full right to be heard. If an attorney
observer qualifies as legally interested, she should be allowed to speak to the
judge about the case. An observer is clearly interested in the proceeding or she
would not be watching a particular trial. The issue is whether or not an observer is
legally interested in the proceeding. Assuming the term "legally interested" can
be equated with "standing to sue" or "standing to intervene," a trial observer is
probably not legally interested. The observer has no personal stake in the out-
come of the trial. Hence, it seems unlikely that an observer would be deemed a
legally interested person.
If an observer cannot be categorized as a legally interested party, is she then a
"disinterested expert"? Arguably, an observer is disinterested; she intends to
watch the trial from a neutral perspective. An observer is also somewhat of an
expert at observing trials and judging the fairness of them. If an observer
qualifies as a disinterested expert, a judge should be able to listen to her upon
notice to the parties to the proceeding. Ordinarily, trial observers would not be
presenting material to a judge, but only asking questions. The questions, how-
ever, may imply a trial observer's views and a judge's responses may also commit
the judge to a particular position.
Conversely, it may be argued that an observer is not a disinterested expert, but
45. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT canon 3 (A)(4) (1984).
46. Id.
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rather was sent to protect the rights of the defendant. 47 Even if an observer is not
pro-defendant, the disinterested expert exception seems designed to allow judges
to talk to technical experts rather than other attorneys. It is possible that an
observer is neither a legally interested person nor a disinterested expert.
Even if such an interpretation were accepted, section A(4) of the Judicial Code
could nevertheless be read to allow a judge the discretion to speak to an observer
about a case as long as the communication was not done ex parte. Hence,
application of section A(4) would not bar observers from asking judges for
interviews. Judges, however, would have the discretion to refuse such requests,
and interviews would have to be conducted with the parties present. As with DR
7-110(B), application of section A(4) would hinder the confidentiality of a trial
observer's work.
In conclusion, DR 7-110(B) and Model Rule 3.5 probably do not apply to U.S.
attorney trial observers, and thus do not prohibit observers from interviewing
judges. If those rules do apply, they only prohibit ex parte interviews. In either
case, attorney observers are always restrained by the possibility of discipline for
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. DR 1-102(A)(5)
states that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice." 48 This broad provision might be used to discipline an
attorney observer if her interview with a judge causes a mistrial, or sets off an
international incident. An observer could respond that the foreign judicial system
was so unfair that her conduct, in fact, furthered the administration of justice.
Still, a court might feel political pressure to discipline an attorney whose conduct
proved to be an embarrassment to the United States. Foreigners acting as trial
observers in the United States should be aware that U.S. judges must comply
with section (A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Interviews will have to be
conducted in the presence of all parties, and judges may, at their discretion, deny
interviews.
C. Interviewing the Defense Attorney or Prosecutor About the Case
There is no provision in the CPR or the Model Rules to guide attorney trial
observers who wish to interview defense attorneys or prosecutors about a case.
The lack of a specific provision should mean that observers may interview de-
fense attorneys or prosecutors under both the CPR and Model Rules. This result
most effectively protects the free speech rights of attorneys acting in their indi-
vidual capacity.
47. See Weissbrodt, supra note 7, at 60 n.165, 61.
48. CPR DR 1-102(A)(5). The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 8.4(d). It states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
MODEL RULEs Rule 8.4d.
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Even though there is no specific provision, an attorney observer is still con-
strained by the broad provisions of the CPR or the Model Rules and thus would
be well-advised to ensure that the interview is not "prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice" within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(5). 49 An attorney should also
bear in mind the broad rule of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (A)(6):
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law. 10
There is always some danger that an interview might set off an international
incident, 5 perhaps resulting in attorney discipline under DR 1-102(A)(4), (A)(5),
or (A)(6). If the attorney observer is careful to remain impartial and does not
unnecessarily draw public attention to her role, there should be no problem with
interviewing the defense attorney or prosecutor.
A foreign observer attending a trial in a U.S. court may have difficulty con-
vincing the prosecutor or defense attorney to grant an interview because of the
U.S. lawyer's responsibility under the CPR and Model Rules. Canon 4 of the
CPR directs lawyers to preserve the confidences and secrets of their clients.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states:
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
52
Prosecutors and defense attorneys may reveal confidential material, but only if
the client consents after full disclosure. U.S. attorneys may be unable or unwill-
49. See supra text accompanying note 48.
50. CPR DR 1-102(A)(4), (A)(6). The analogous provision in the Model Rules states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(b).
5 I. For example, the prosecutor could object to the conduct of the observer and could complain not
only to the sending organization, but to the embassy of the observer's county and to the press.
52. CPR DR 4-101(B), (C). The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 1.6(a). It states: "A
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation .... MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
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ing to seek client consent and may, therefore, wish to avoid speaking with foreign
trial observers.
Although Canon 4 might prevent the observer from getting answers, it should not
prevent her from asking questions. When an observer asks a question, she may
not know if the answer will contain confidential information. Even if the observer
knows the answer will contain client confidences, she may still ask the question.
Canon 4 does not prohibit the prosecutor and defense attorney from revealing
secrets if their clients consent. Hence, there is no reason to prohibit an observer
from asking questions. Under the CPR, ultimate responsibility for preserving
client confidences rests upon prosecutors and defense attorneys, not trial
observers.
D. Interviewing a Defendant Out of the Presence of His Attorney
Trial observers often wish to interview a defendant out of the presence of his
attorney of record. The relevant provision of the CPR is DR 7-104(A). This
provision states:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized
by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.53
This provision specifically applies to an attorney "during the course of his
representation of a client." Since an attorney trial observer is not connected with
either party to a trial, DR 7-104(A) does not apply to observers. Observers are
thus free to interview defendants without the presence of their attorneys.
As always, there is some danger that the observer might violate a broad CPR
provision such as DR 1-102(A)(4), (A)(5), or (A)(6). 54 It might be considered
prejudicial to the administration of justice to interview a defendant when his
attorney is not present. As a matter of courtesy, an observer may wish to ask the
defendant's attorney for permission to interview the defendant. Putting aside
these considerations, however, the attorney observer is not prohibited by the CPR
from interviewing a defendant alone.
53. CPR DR 7-104(A) (emphasis added). The analogous provision in the Model Rules states: "in
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a
party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 50.
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E. Commenting Publicly About the Trial
The subject of trial publicity is covered by DR 7-107.11 This disciplinary rule
places significant restrictions on the ability of certain lawyers to comment pub-
licly on a trial. These limitations apply to lawyers participating in or associated
with the investigation, prosecution, or defense of criminal,5 6 civil, and admin-
istrative matters. 57
An attorney who acts as a trial observer is ideally a neutral, unbiased observer
and is not formally associated with the prosecution or defense. Some trial observ-
ers argue that an observer is not a neutral force, but a supplemental advocate for
the defense.58 It is true that observers usually attend trials when a defendant is in
danger of being unjustifiably convicted. The observer, however, receives no
payment from the defendant, nor does she take an active role in the defense.
Hence, it is difficult to argue that the trial observer is truly associated with the
prosecution or defense of the defendant and subject to the provisions of DR
7-107.
Even if DR 7-107 is applicable to attorney trial observers, its application is
subject to first amendment restraints. Case law makes it clear that attorneys who
are not counsel of record retain their first amendment rights. For example, in Polk
v. State Bar of Texas, 59 plaintiff, an attorney, was accused of driving while
intoxicated. Trial was originally set for October 1971, and then reset for
November 1971. When the attorney failed to appear on the October date, he was
arrested and jailed for failing to appear at a criminal trial. He then issued a press
release which explained the date changes and stated: "'I consider this one more
awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical district attorney and a perverse
judge to assure me an unfair trial. "'6 The grievance committee of the State Bar
of Texas reprimanded the attorney for the press statement, and he appealed. The
district court held that a private citizen does not surrender his right to freedom of
expression by becoming a licensed attomey.61 The court reasoned:
The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response to the manner in
which he was treated as a citizen and not as an attorney. At no time was Polk an
attorney of record or in any way acting in his capacity as an attorney in the criminal
proceedings against him, nor do the remarks purport to be made in his capacity as
an attorney.
6
1
55. The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 3.6.
56. CPR DR 7-107(A)-(F).
57. CPR DR 7-107(G), (H).
58. See Weissbrodt, supra note 7, at 60 n. 165, 61.
59. 374 E Supp. 784, 786 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
60. Id. at 786.
61. Id. at 787.
62. Id. at 788.
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A trial observer, similarly, acts in her individual capacity, rather than as an
attorney, in the trial she observes. She should therefore not be prohibited from
commenting publicly on that trial.
A federal district court in Illinois has also discussed the first amendment rights
of attorneys. In In re Oliver 63 an attorney filed a petition asking for the postpone-
ment of all criminal cases pending in United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois until the conclusion of the trial of the Chicago Seven. 64
After filing suit, the attorney held a prearranged conference with the media and
made comments both about his suit and the Chicago Seven case. The federal
district court reprimanded him for the comments he made about his own suit 65
but made clear that his comments about the Chicago Seven case were not the
subject of the reprimand. The court stated:
The petition .. .in part and some of Mr. Oliver's comments to the press and
television related to another case pending in this court, United States v. Dellinger.
The comments in the petition and in the press and television interviews relating to
the Dellinger case are not of course the subject of this citation .... The respondent
obviously had the right and might even have a duty as a member of the bar to
comment on any case he deems worthy of his self esteemed comments, so long as
he is not active as counsel in the case he comments upon. 66
Oliver and Polk support the contention that non-record, attorney trial observers
have a first amendment right to comment on foreign trials. Neither case considers
any limitations which might be imposed pursuant to the CPR. Instead, the courts
have broadly construed the right of an attorney to comment publicly on a case in
which she is not the attorney of record.
One court has held that DR 7-107's blanket prohibition of certain types of trial
publicity by attorneys of record is unconstitutionally overbroad. 67 In Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, the Seventh Circuit held that "[ojnly those com-
ments that pose a 'serious and imminent threat' of interference with the fair
administration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed."68 Even the "reason-
able likelihood" of interference standard applied by a local court rule was uncon-
stitutional according to the court. 69
63. 308 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. III. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F2d Ill (7th Cir. 1971).
64. See In re Oliver, 452 F2d at 115 (7th Cir. 1971) (Duffy, J., dissenting).
65. 308 E Supp. at 1185.
66. Id. at 1184-85.
67. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976).
68. 522 F.2d at 249. The court noted that even if the serious and imminent threat standard were
incorporated in each part of the Disciplinary Rule, some portions of it would still be unconstitutional
because of vagueness, or because they prohibited comments that could never be a "serious and
imminent threat." See id. at 252-59.
69. 522 F2d at 249 (discussing Rule 1.07 of the Local Criminal Rules of the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois).
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In Hirschkop v. Snead, 7 0 the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the strict standard
imposed in Bauer under which DR 7-107 can be constitutionally enforced.7' The
court held that the "reasonable likelihood" standard is implicit in the Rule. 72 As
such, the Rule's prohibitions of certain types of publicity in criminal cases tried
before juries are constitutional. 73 Even under the reasonable likelihood standard,
however, DR 7-107 is unconstitutional when applied to civil or administrative
cases or criminal bench trials. 
74
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of DR 7-107.71 It
appears plausible, however, that if the Supreme Court were to hear a case on this
issue, it might decide that DR 7-107 is unconstitutionally overbroad. Such a
decision would, of course, prohibit any restriction on the comments of trial
observers, regardless of their relationship to the trial participants.
Model Rule 3.6 replaces the standard set out in the CPR with a new standard
that has different ramifications for the attorney observer who wishes to make a
public statement on a trial she has observed. It states that "[a] lawyer shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasona-
bly should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudic-
ing an adjudicative proceeding."
'7 6
This standard is at once broader and narrower than DR 7-107 of the Model
Code. Taking account of the constitutional considerations raised in Bauer and
Hirschkop, it is sufficiently limited to permit an attorney observer to comment on
the fairness of a proceeding. An attorney observer may not, however, base her
right to comment publicly on the fact that she is not officially associated with the
investigation, prosecution, or defense of a matter. The Model Rules do not
distinguish between neutral observers and participants. Hence, an attorney ob-
server may not claim that her comments are beyond the scope of the Model Rules
because she is not counsel of record in the case she is observing.
F. What an Observer Should Do if She Learns of Exculpatory Facts
The only CPR provision which relates directly to disclosure of exculpatory
facts is DR 7-103(B). It requires public prosecutors and government lawyers in
70. 594 E2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
71. 594 F.2d at 362, 370.
72. Id. at 368.
73. 594 F2d at 368-71.
74. Id. at 372-74. The court, citing Bauer, held DR-107(D), which prohibits "statements that are
reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial," unconstitutional because of vagueness. Id. at 371.
75. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding unconstitutional the prohibi-
tion of advertising by lawyers). The decision in Bates may have an effect on the analysis of DR 7-107
by the courts. One of the underlying purposes of DR 7-107 is to prevent attorneys from making public
statements for the purpose of gaining free advertising. Now that attorney advertising is permitted, one
of the underlying rationales for DR 7-107 is gone.
76. MODEL RULES Rule 3.6 (emphasis added).
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criminal trials to disclose to the defendants or their counsel the existence of
evidence that tends to "negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment. "77 Because trial observers do not work for the
prosecution, they are under no obligation to report exculpatory facts to defense
counsel.
There is only one situation where a trial observer may be required to report
exculpatory facts. This situation occurs where an observer learns that a fraud has
been perpetrated upon the tribunal. In this case, under DR 7-102(B)(2), an
observer is required to reveal the fraud promptly to the tribunal."7 This problem
may occur, for example, if a trial observer learns that a prosecution witness has
committed perjury.
The dependence of the duty to disclose on the presence or absence of fraud
makes little sense. Failure to disclose any type of exculpatory information is
prejudicial to clients and the administration of justice. Even if an observer is not
required to disclose exculpatory facts to the defense under DR 7-103(B), DR
1-102(A)(5), which requires lawyers to refrain from conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice,7 9 suggests that an observer ought not remain silent
about those facts.
If an observer decides to disclose exculpatory facts to the defense, she must
decide whether the prosecution and judge should also be apprised of those facts.
The CPR and the Model Rules provide no guidance on this issue. If an observer
is to remain neutral, however, she should reveal the information to all parties.
There is an obvious discrepancy in this situation between what the observer
must and should do. An attorney observer is only required to reveal fraud perpe-
trated on a tribunal to that tribunal. If an observer reveals a fraud to the judge,
however, she should also reveal the fraud to the prosecution and defense. If an
observer discovers nonfraudulent exculpatory information, she does not have to
reveal it. The CPR implies, however, that she should reveal the information to the
defense. Because of the observer's neutral status, she should also disclose the
information to the prosecution and the judge.
77. CPR DR 7-103(B). The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 3.8(d). It states:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigat-
ing information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(d).
78. CPR DR 7-102(B)(2). The analogous provision in the Model Rules is Rule 3.3(a)(2).
79. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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G. What an Observer Should Do if She Learns of Incriminating Facts
Analysis of this issue is similar to the analysis of the duty to disclose ex-
culpatory facts. If an attorney observer learns that a defendant or a defense
witness has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal, the tribunal must be notified
pursuant to DR 7-102(B)(2). To maintain neutrality, an observer may then wish to
reveal the same information to the prosecution and the defense.
If an observer learns incriminating facts but there was no fraud upon the court,
the answer to this question becomes more difficult. There is no counterpart to DR
7-102(B) concerning incriminating evidence. Therefore, the CPR places no af-
firmative duty on an observer to reveal such evidence, nor can one infer such a
duty from language in the CPR. An attorney observer must use her own judgment
in deciding whether incriminating facts should be revealed. Since a trial observer
is not a participant in the proceedings, she should be reluctant to get involved by
providing information to the court or the parties. Such involvement may under-
mine the observer's appearance of neutrality. If an observer reveals such informa-
tion, however, neutrality might dictate that all parties be notified of the new
evidence.
H. Conclusion
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit U.S. attorney observers
from interviewing jurors but probably do not prohibit them from interviewing
judges. Observers can also interview defense attorneys or prosecutors about their
cases and can probably interview defendants outside the presence of their attor-
neys. Attorney observers can comment publicly about cases that they have ob-
served, both during and after trials. If an attorney observer discovers that
someone has perpetrated a fraud upon the tribunal, the observer must tell the
tribunal. In the absence of fraud, the observer need not reveal exculpatory facts,
but probably should reveal them to the parties involved. In the absence of fraud,
the observer should use her own discretion in deciding whether to reveal in-
criminating facts so long as she does not undermine her appearance of neutrality.
II. THE LIMITS OF ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SETTING
The Model Code requires a lawyer to act with competence and proper care in
representing a client. 8 0 The Model Rules define competent representation as that
"legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
• . . representation" of a client. 8 This definition, however, does not answer the
80. CPR Canon 6, EC 6-1.
81. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1.
236 TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
question of whether competent representation includes acquiring and utilizing
confidential information in the representation of a client. The answer to this
question becomes important in both international and domestic law. One of these
situations in the field of international law occurs when an attorney litigating a
claim under a United Nations human rights procedure cannot pursue it adequately
without acquiring information which is supposed to be kept confidential under
the rules of the United Nations. A U.S. lawyer's responsibility to his client under
the Model Rules and Model Code generally permit him to acquire and use this
confidential information.
A. The Procedural Setting for the Problem
The problems caused by confidentiality requirements are illustrated by the
difficulties that arise when a lawyer represents a client pursuant to the procedure
established under the United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution
1503 .82 This procedure is biased against complainant-clients. It can be manipu-
lated by the governments involved to the detriment of complainants. While the
procedure can result in some benefit for a complainant, a positive outcome is
more likely if a complainant's lawyer is willing to take the necessary measures to
represent the client zealously, even if such actions are not envisioned under the
UN procedures.
Resolution 1503 establishes one of the most important international procedures
for the consideration of communications concerning human rights violations.
While there are other human rights procedures in the United Nations and else-
where which afford more careful deliberation, are more prompt, give individual
complainants more rights, and may provide a better chance of remedy, 3 the 1503
procedure has, over the past decade, remained one of the most important and
certainly one of the best-known procedures. The 1503 process culminates in the
announcement, by the Chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights, of a list
of countries responsible for a consistent pattern of gross human rights vio-
82. Resolution 1503, supra note 8.
83. A variety of international procedures are available to individuals who wish to bring complaints
before international organizations. See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICE (H. Hannum ed. 1984) (contains chapters on various procedures available through the UN
Commission on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights); Farer & Rowles, The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 47 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978)
(describing the procedures adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights); Kramer &
Weissbrodt, The 1980 U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the Disappeared, 3 HUM. RTS. Q.,
Feb. 1981, at 18 (describing the establishment of the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary
Disappearances); O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1980) (describing the practice and procedure adopted by the
European Convention on Human Rights).
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lations. 4 Inclusion in this widely-published list is embarrassing for any
government.
Resolution 1503 provides that any communications received by the United
Nations alleging a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights shall be
considered by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities. 85 The Sub-Commission delegates the first review of the thou-
sands of communications received by the United Nations prior to July 1st of each
year to a Working Group of five members of the Sub-Commission. The Working
Group meets for two weeks in late July and considers not only the communica-
tions, but also any responses which the governments concerned may wish to
provide. No provisions are made for notifying the complainant as to the govern-
ment's response or for permitting a rebuttal. Generally, only about two or three
dozen communications are considered sufficiently meritorious to be given serious
consideration by the Working Group. Although there is authority for consolidat-
ing individual communications to assess whether a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights exists in a particular country,86 the Working Group
carefully reviews only those single communications which muster sufficient facts
to support a finding that a government is responsible for gross and systematic
human rights violations.
The 1503 procedure requires that all measures taken throughout the process be
kept confidential. 87 The Working Group must meet in secret session and report its
84. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the 40th Session of the Commission on
Human Rights, 1984 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4), at 151, U.N. Doc. E/1984/14 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as 40th Sess. Report] For a list of the countries reportedly considered under ECOSOC 1503
between 1973 and 1977, see Tolley, The Concealed Crack in the Citadel; The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights' Response to Confidential Communications, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 420, 442
In principle, this list contains confidential information. For a list of the 28 countries identified in
official Commission documents as the subject of 1503 decisions from 1978 to 1984, see id. at 446.
85. See Resolution 1503, supra note 8, at para. 1. For a more detailed description of the 1503
procedure from the practitioner's perspective, see Shelton, Individual Complaint Machinery under
the United Nations 1503 Procedure and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 83, at 59
(describing the procedures of both Resolution 1503 and the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
86. See Resolution 1503, supra note 8, at paras. 1, 5.
87. In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, the problems of confidentiality, secret law, and secret
procedure under Resolution 1503 may have been partially resolved by the action of the UN Economic
and Social Council at its 1985 session. Since 1977 Uruguay has been kept under consideration by the
Commission on Human Rights as exhibiting a consistent pattern of gross violations. See Tolley, supra
note 84, at 442, 446 (1984). In the fall of 1984 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities evidently referred the human rights situation to the Commission under
Resolution 1503. But in the intervening months there was an election in Uruguay and a change in
government. Most of the prisoners who had been held for years have been released, the "Punta
Rieles" prison has been closed, and exiles are being welcomed home. Statement of Senator Alberto
Zumaran, Especial Representative of the Government of Uruguay to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights (Mar. 8, 1985).
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conclusions to the Sub-Commission in a confidential document.88 The Sub-
Commission is required to refer confidentially to the UN Commission on Human
Rights those "situations" that "appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross
violations." 89
In practice, however, the Sub-Commission follows a different procedure. Dur-
ing August sessions, the Sub-Commission rejects some communications and
keeps others under consideration until the following year's session. The Sub-
Commission's decisions are "confidential"; authors of communications are not
informed whether they have won or lost. The United Nations, however, without
authority under ECOSOC 1503, has developed a practice of informing the af-
fected governments that communications regarding their country have been trans-
mitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights or have been kept under review
by the Sub-Commission.
Each January, a Working Group on Communications, comprised of members
of the Commission on Human Rights, meets before the Commission session to
draft recommendations as to how each 1503 communication should be handled
by the Commission. The Working Group meets in private session and may
recommend various dispositions to the full Commission. Under ECOSOC 1503,
the Commission is authorized to meet in private during its February-March
session to recommend the mounting of a "thorough study" or an even more
intensive inquiry by an ad hoc fact-finding body.90 In fact, the Commission has
never actually recommended either of the two approaches authorized under
ECOSOC 1503. Instead, the Working Group has proposed and the Commission
has developed an expanding repertoire of approaches to the accused government.
The Working Group may, among other measures, pose written questions to the
government concerned, authorize a member of the Commission to make direct
After several governments congratulated Uruguay on the progress it had made toward human
rights, the Conmmission went into private session to consider the still pending complaint under
ECOSOC 1503. After a brief confidential session, the Chairman of the Commission announced that
the Commission had decided to discontinue the discussions of Uruguay under its confidential pro-
cedure. The Chairman added that the "documents on the subject were no longer secret." United
Nations, Press Release No. HR/1680, at I (Mar. 8, 1985).
While the Commission's decision on Uruguay was being considered by the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), the government of Argentina also asked for the release of material relating to
proceedings against the previous government in that country. The ECOSOC decided to make public
1503 documents on both Argentina and Uruguay. See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report of
the Second (Social) Committee, U.N. Doc. E/1985/95, at 25, 31 (1985). When the ECOSOC deci-
sions on the Argentina and Uruguay materials have been implemented, significant insights into the
secret processes of Resolution 1503 will be possible for both scholars and potential litigants. Nev-
ertheless, other cases remain cloaked in confidentiality.
88. Resolution 1503, supra note 8, at para. 8.
89. Id. at paras. 5, 8.
90. See id. at paras. 6, 7.
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contact with the government, send a UN staff person to the country, keep the case
under consideration, or dismiss the case.
In 1979 the Commission decided in private session that accused governments
should be permitted to participate in the private session-even while the votes are
taken on each communication. Authors of communications are not, however,
permitted to attend. The Working Group's recommendations are not even pro-
vided to authors of communications, and the Commission itself meets in private
session to consider 1503 communications.
In the public session following the private 1503 deliberations, little information
regarding the status of the proceeding is revealed. The Chair of the Commission
announces only that certain governments have been the subject of discussions
under ECOSOC 1503.91 Until the 1984 session, the Chair did not reveal how the
Commission dealt with the communications or anything about the substance of
the communications. In 1984 and 1985, although not authorized by ECOSOC
1503, the Chair did announce that the Commission had determined to drop the
communications about certain countries identified in the list. 92
It should be clear from the brief description above that beginning on the date
when the communication is submitted until the very fragmentary announcement
of the Commission's decision, the complainant-author of the communication is
not officially permitted to know how the communication has been received. In
this respect, the Commission closely follows the wording of Resolution 1503
which requires that "all actions envisaged in the implementation of the present
resolution . . . shall remain confidential until such time as the Commission may
decide to make recommendations to the Economic and Social Council." 93 But
while the 1503 process leaves the complainants in the dark, the accused govern-
ments are informed and involved at several important points. Indeed, the purpose
of the secrecy is obviously to shield the governments from undue or, indeed,
nearly any embarrassment-at least until the Chair of the Commission an-
nounces the Commission's decision.
In order to be an effective advocate in this rather strange setting, an attorney
needs to know whether the government answered the communication, how the
government responded, whether the Working Group referred the communication
to the Sub-Commission, whether the Sub-Commission referred the matter to the
Commission, what recommendation was made by the Working Group, the nature
of the defense raised by the government at the Commission, and the Commis-
91. The authors of the communications are never informed whether they have won or lost. The
substance of the communication is not generally released. Because there may be several communica-
tions about one country relating to different matters, a complainant-author is left uncertain as to
whether it would be appropriate to file a new communication for the following year.
92. See, e.g., 40th Sess. Report, supra note 84, at 151.
93. Resolution 1503, supra note 8, at para. 8. The language of paragraph 8 appears to bind UN
employees and other official participants in the 1503 process, but does not apply to attorneys repre-
senting clients who are not officially informed of the "actions envisaged." Id.
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sion's resolution of the issue. If an attorney knows the status of a complaint, she
can effectively lobby for the complainant's position with members of the Sub-
Commission. In addition, an informed attorney can press the accused govern-
ment to agree to a solution that will allow the government to avoid embarrass-
ment. Governments lobby the members of the Sub-Commission throughout the
process and often without corresponding lobbying from a complainant's side, his
chance of success is diminished. Futhermore, if a complainant knows that his
complaint was successful in the Sub-Commission, he can provide updated infor-
mation to supplement the complaint for consideration by the Commission.
Despite the rather daunting language of ECOSOC 1503 and considerable effort
by responsible UN officials to keep the process secret, 94 most authors of commu-
nications are able to obtain information regarding the status of their complaints.
The Sub-Commission is comprised of 26 individuals who are nominated by their
governments and elected for three-year terms by the Commission. 95 In principle,
the members of the Sub-Commission are experts on human rights who are at least
formally independent of their governments. Some members of the Sub-Commis-
sion are, in fact, well-recognized experts and maintain their independence. Oth-
ers work as diplomats or government employees and have very little
independence from their governments or expertise in human rights. With such a
diverse group, it is not surprising that the members of the Sub-Commission
maintain the confidentiality of the 1503 process in varying degrees. Some mem-
bers inform their own governments about the results of each step in the 1503
process-particularly if their governments have been accused of violating human
rights. Once a member tells anyone about the results of the Sub-Commission's
deliberations, word travels fast. Observers for governments, intergovernmental
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations also attend the public meet-
ings of the Sub-Commission. These observers are often willing to discuss the
status of communications before the Commission. As a result, most attorneys for
complainants can discover the status of 1503 complaints without effort. Indeed,
the tentative list of countries developed by the Sub-Commission is often pub-
lished in the Guardian or other newspapers. 96
Once discussion of a communication moves to the full Commission on Human
Rights, it becomes even easier for an attorney to obtain information regarding its
94. The staff of the communications unit in the UN Center for Human Rights is extremely reticent
in speaking to with either government or nongovernmental representatives. They are careful not to
reveal confidential material. Governments are much less reluctant to discuss these issues-particu-
larly if leakage of information might be consistent with their political interest.
95. E.S.C. Res. 1334, 44 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 18, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968), amended
by E.S.C. Dec. 1978/21, 1978 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. I) at 37, U.N. Doc. E/DEC/1978/6-40, at 12
(1978).
96. See T. ZUJDWIJK, supra note 8, at 41-45, 70-71; see also Berlin, U.N. Rights Unit to Probe
Violations, N.Y. Post, Feb. 7, 1974, at 14, reprinted in R. LILuCH & E NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 363-64 (1979).
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status. The Commission on Human Rights is comprised of 43 governments. With
so many governmental delegations, it is likely that the relevant aspects of a
particular 1503 proceeding will become known to anyone who attends Commis-
sion sessions and wishes to know the status of a communication.
Some governments have objected to the continual leaks of confidential infor-
mation, but, because governments are the principal source of the leaks, the
Commission on Human Rights has not been able effectively to eliminate them.
On at least three occasions the Commission has adopted resolutions expressing
concern over leaks of confidential information. On two of these occasions the
Commission went so far as to initiate investigations to discover the source of
information published in Le Monde and the Guardian. 97 The investigations were
promptly dropped when the two reporters refused to identify their sources. There
was no sanction imposed upon the reporters. The third leak was made by the
chief U.S. delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1980 when he
announced in a press conference that he was pleased that the German Democratic
Republic was being considered under the 1503 process. 98
While it is clear that Resolution 1503 forbids the release of information con-
cerning the progress of a communication alleging a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights, it is also clear that the prohibition is not effectively
enforced and that lawyers who represent complainants need to and regularly do
obtain the information necessary to pursue their claims through the labyrinth of
UN bodies. On the one hand, the norm of confidentiality does persist and is
prominently mentioned by government representatives at the Commission on
Human Rights. On the other hand, it is doubtful that such a loosely and unfairly
enforced norm of confidentiality ought to be the basis of any ethical complaint
against a U.S. lawyer who breaches this norm. A lawyer cannot properly repre-
sent a client without in some way breaching the norm. Accordingly, U.S. lawyers
must come to grips with the proper approach to the confidentiality requirement of
ECOSOC 1503.
B. The Restraints on Obtaining Confidential Information Imposed by
the Code and the Model Rules
U.S. attorneys are bound by Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity to represent their clients "zealously within the bounds of the law." 99 The
97. Report of the Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrim. & Protection of Minorities on its 31st
Session, Res. 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1296, at 70 (1978), discussed in T. ZULJDWlJK, supra note 8, at
44. The decision to undertake the investigation of the Guardian was not officially reported.
98. See Review of the 37th Session and Upcoming 38th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations, House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Sess., 1st Sess. 49 (1981) (prepared statement of David Weissbrodt).
99. CPR Canon 7.
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Model Rules use different words but impose a similar burden. '00 To carry out this
duty, an attorney must leave no stones unturned in fulfilling his duty of represen-
tation to a client. An attorney may not, however, break the law in representing a
client.
When working in an international setting, and in particular in an ECOSOC
1503 proceeding, it is difficult for attorneys to know when zealous representation
has gone beyond the bounds of the law. The written rules and procedures often
differ from actual practice. In order to represent their client, attorneys needs to
know more than they would be permitted to know under a restrictive reading of
the UN rules.
Although it is not public information, attorneys need to know the status of 1503
proceedings. Knowledge of the relevant facts is imperative to effective represen-
tation. Therefore, attorneys must attempt to obtain all information relevant to
their clients' 1503 complaints. Neither the CPR nor the Model Rules prohibit
attorneys from learning relevant information.
An attorney may use any means that are not illegal in order to obtain this
information. The CPR limits an attorney's activities by prohibiting him from
assisting his client "in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudu-
lent" ' 0' and in knowingly engaging in illegal conduct himself. 102 The Code does
not define illegal conduct. Instead, it leaves this question to local law. Hence,
some means, such as breaking into an office to obtain information,' clearly would
be illegal, while others, such as asking an acquaintance what happened in a
meeting, would not be illegal. When determining whether a certain means of
gaining information might be illegal, it can be argued that an attorney should
resolve all doubt in favor of his client. 103
100. MODEL RULES Rules 1.1-1.3.
101. CPR 7-102(A)(7). See also MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d).
102. Id. at 7-102(A)(8). There is no equivalent provision in the Model Rules.
103. Cf. CPR EC 7-3. It seems a violation of fundamental fairness that the 1503 procedure affords
governments so much access to the decision makers and complainants so little. Indeed, there is so
much secret law and secret procedure in the 1503 process, that it would be inappropriate to suggest
that an attorney is somehow unethical in trying to cope effectively with a basically unfair system.
Professor Frank Newman was one of the first advocates to grapple with the secrecy, news leaks,
and rumors surrounding the 1503 procedures. He observed that "[e]ven if the UN procedures are
Caligula-like, for due justice we ought not yet rely on inadvertence or gumshoe techniques." New-
man, The new United Nations procedures for human rights complaints: reform, status quo, or
chambers of horror?, 34 ANNALES DE DROIT 129, 133 (1974).
Such problems of secret law have occurred in the United States. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 412-13 (1935); Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law-A Plea for
Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198, 212-13 (1934) (arguing for
the passage of a statute that would require the publication of all administration rules and regulations);
Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 929, 929-31 (1950); see also I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.18, at
364-65 (2nd ed. 1978). In Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1872), the Supreme
Court sustained the application of a Presidential proclamation which had been filed with the Secretary
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Once information regarding the status of a proceeding has been gathered,
attorneys must decide how to use the information. Although the CPR does not
give explicit guidance on this issue either, it appears that there are some limita-
tions on what can be done with the information. The CPR implies that an
attorney, when lobbying on behalf of his client, should make full use of all
information, regardless of whether or not it comes from confidential sources.
First, DR 7-1O(A)(1) states: "A lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by
law." 1o4 If a lawyer has information which he does not use despite his client's
desire that he use it, the lawyer has not used "all available means." Second, the
ethical rules accompanying Canon 7 indicate that a lawyer should always take all
measures that would support the best interests of his client. Ethical Consideration
7-9 states, for example, that "a lawyer should always act in a manner consistent
with the best interests of his client." 105 If the information is helpful in making a
client's case, it should be used.
A lawyer must be careful in using this evidence if the complaint is before an
international tribunal. Confidential information might not be admissible under
international guidelines. 106 If the information is not admissible, a lawyer may not
use the information in a legal proceeding. 0 7 Even so, the CPR permits lawyers to
use confidential information in developing a litigation strategy and in lobbying in
the UN for their clients' positions.
C. Conclusion
The discussion above argues that attorneys have an obligation to seek out and
obtain confidential information if such information would help their clients take
full advantage of the legal system. Taking full advantage of the legal system
translates into gathering enough information to develop a litigation strategy.
of State, but had not otherwise been published. The Court relied upon the theoretical availability of
the proclamation to any individual who requested it. Id. at 199. Under the 1503 process, however, the
secret decisions and secret procedures are not even theoretically available to the claimant. Such
secrecy problems in the United States were largely cured by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982), and the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). But see
Martin v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (secret law used by Bureau of Indian Affairs).
104. CPR DR 7-10I(A)(I).
105. CPR EC 7-9.
106. As to admissibility standards in international fact-finding, see Weissbrodt & McCarthy, Fact-
Finding by International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. I,
64-66 (1981); see also Reisman & Freedman, The Plaintiffs Dilemma: Illegally Obtained Evidence
and Admissibility in International Adjudication, 76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 737 (1982); Thirlway, Dilemma
or Chimera?-Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in International Adjudication, 78 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 622 (1984).
107. See CPR EC 7-26 (permitting an attorney to present any "admissible evidence" to a tribunal
so long as she does not know that the evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured).
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Since most of the secret law and procedure under 1503 will be useful in establish-
ing a litigation strategy, no ethical problem should arise from seeking out confi-
dential information for the benefit of a client.
IV. AN ATTORNEY'S OBLIGATION To PURSUE A CLAIM DILIGENTLY
International human rights law is a relatively new area of international law.
With the possible exception of the European Human Rights Commission and the
European Court of Human Rights, most international human rights institutions
are still striving to develop their legitimacy, substantive law, and procedures. 101
Similarly, U.S. courts are not yet accustomed to using international human rights
law as the basis for decisions or as an aid in interpreting constitutional
principles. 109
While international human rights law has been the subject of more codification
than many, if not all, other areas of international law, relatively few judicial or
other interpretive decisions have been rendered in U.S. courts or international
fora. Since this area of law is relatively new, each case and resulting decision
may have a significant impact upon the future development of the law and upon
the way the courts and human rights institutions view their roles.
Even though international institutions often do not follow the common law
practice of U.S. courts in adhering to precedent, "10 the impact of decisions in
particular cases can be considerable. Lawyers and decision makers rely directly
or indirectly upon the principles enunciated in previous cases. For example,
although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights does not formally
follow precedent, it has developed a body of doctrine which it publishes and
attempts to apply in a consistent fashion. "I Similarly, the Human Rights Com-
mittee, organized pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, regularly issues general comments presenting the Committee's au-
108. See, e.g., Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985) (describing the development of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
since its inception in 1979).
109. See, e.g., Burke, Coliver, de la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human
Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 292 (1983); see also Hartman,
"Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of
the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (1983) (exploring issues concerning the domestic
incorporation of international human rights law with regard to the death penalty). See generally
Whisman, Selected Bibliography: Articles and Cases on International Human Rights Law in Domes-
tic Courts, 18 INT'L LAW. 83 (1984) (citing articles and cases considering the application of interna-
tional human rights law in U.S. courts).
110. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, reprinted in INT'L COURT OF
JUSTICE, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT, Series D, No. 1,
at 37, 49 (1947).
Ill. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES
1971-1981, at 315-44 (1982).
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thoritative interpretation of the various articles in the Covenant. 112 It has also on
one occasion issued a severely edited account of its procedural and substantive
jurisprudence with respect to cases arising under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant. 3
Although international human rights cases may be initiated by individuals, the
resulting decisions will probably have consequences for many other potential
claimants. Lawyers and their clients must consider their ethical obligations to
those future litigants when faced with such a case.
A. Examples of the Dilemma
Two recent cases, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic114 and Baby Boy, 5 illus-
trate this problem. Tel-Oren arose out of a 1978 terrorist attack by 13 heavily
armed members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on a bus in
northern Israel . The attack, hostage taking, and subsequent events resulted in 34
deaths and 87 injuries. The Israeli survivors brought an action for damages in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 116 The federal district court ruled that it lacked jurisdic-
112. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Under Article 40, Paragraph 4,
of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add. 1, at 2-6 (1982) (general comments on articles 6, 7,
and 9).
113. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Draft Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General
Assembly Through the Economic and Social Council Under Article 45 of the Covenant and Article 6
of the Optional Protocol, U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/XXII/CRP. I/Add. 17 & Add. 18 (1984) (unpublished
documents for participants only, copy on file with the author).
114. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Edwards, Bork, and Robb, JJ., concurring), affg 517 F Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3612 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985) (No. 83-2052). For discussions of the circuit court's opinions in
Tel-Oren, see D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 92 (1985); Rubin, Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously
Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 105 (1985); and D'Amato, Professor Rubin's Reply Does Not Live Up to
Its Title, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1985). See also Note, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236 (1982-83); Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941 (1984). For a general discussion of issues
concerning the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over terrorist acts abroad, see Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law
Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1983).
115. Resolution No. 23/81, Case 2141 (United States) (Mar. 6, 1981), reprinted in INTER-AMERi-
CAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, ANNUAL REPORT 1980-1981, at 25, OAS
Doc. OEA.Ser.l/V/1l.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Case 2141].
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). Section 1350 provides that the "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." Id. The Alien Tort Claims Act has been the subject of much
commentary since the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980). See generally Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981);
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tion over the claim. Plaintiffs appealed and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirmed per curiam with each member of the panel
writing a separate opinion. "I
At this juncture, the attorneys for the plaintiffs were encouraged not to seek a
review by the Supreme Court. "8 If the Supreme Court granted a hearing, affir-
mance of the dismissal was inevitable and likely to be accompanied by strong
language undermining Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, "I the most important decision of
Burke, Coliver, de ]a Vega & Rosenbaum, supra note 109, at 315-22; Lillich, The Role of Domestic
Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE, supra note 83, at 223, 233-236; Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, II GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 311 (1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Law as the Rule of
Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 874 (1981); Comment, International Law and Human Rights-Alien
Tort Claims Under 28 U.S.C § 1350: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 66 MINN. L. REV. 357 (1982); Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 1014-24 (1982); Comment, The Lone-
liness of the Long Distance Statute, The Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1263
(1980).
117. 726 F.2d at 775. The judges could not agree on a single opinion, but unanimously concurred
that the case should not be heard in the U.S. federal courts. Id. Judge Edwards indicated that he
agreed with the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga, holding that the relatives of an alien who had
been tortured to death by a police officer acting under the authority of the alien's government could
maintain an action in federal district court against the police officer. Id. at 776 (Edwards, I.,
concurring). Judge Edwards distinguished Filartiga from Tel-Oren by noting that the PLO did not
qualify as a government, id. at 791, and that there existed no international customary law prohibiting
the terrorist acts alleged in the suit. Id. at 795-96. Judge Bork filed a lengthy concurring opinion in
which he strenuously disagreed with the interpretation of section 1350 adopted in Filartiga. Id. at
820-21 (Bork, J., concurring). He theorized that in order for section 1350 to establish jurisdiction, not
only must there be a violation of international law, id. at 806-08, but international law must
expressly create a domestic cause of action in tort. Id. at 801. Since it is unclear whether there exists
any such international law, Judge Bork's opinion would essentially turn section 1350 into a nullity.
Judge Robb's opinion suggested that the court should not take jurisdiction because the case raised
political questions. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). If Judge Robb were so concerned about the
political implications of the law suit, he could have suggested that the court seek the advice of the
U.S. Department of State, as did the Second Circuit in Filartiga.
118. Telephone conversation with Jeffrey Peck, Washington, D.C. (May 1984) (Peck was one of the
attorneys for the plantiffs in Tel-Oren); Conversation with Professor Richard Lillich, University of
Virginia Law School (April 24, 1985). Attorney Peck told me that others had called to urge that no
petition for certiorari be filed. After the circuit court's decision one observer commented:
Hanoch stands as an unfortunate example of what can go wrong when attorneys bring actions
based on international human rights law claims without the advice and support of international
law experts. As bad as was the district court decision, the prevailing wisdom was and is that it
should never have been appealed. Certainly, the opinions we now have are far more damaging.
Because of the prestige of the D.C. Circuit on international law questions in general and of
Judge Bork in particular, the opinions are likely to be more influential than their confused
analyses would otherwise suggest.
Recent Cases, HUMAN RTS. ADVOC. NEWSLETTER, Apr. 1984, at 1, 2-3.
119. 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the past thirty years applying international human rights law in the courts of the
United States. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs responded to this advice by
saying that he had only a duty to his client and no ethical responsibility for the
favorable development of the law. 120
In Baby Boy, the attorneys for the plaintiffs were faced with a similar dilemma.
The plaintiffs were challenging legalized abortion in the United States before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2' This case was doomed to
failure. The United States has indicated a willingness to be bound by the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,' and has signed, but not
ratified, the American Convention on Human Rights. The American Declara-
tion protects the right to life, but does not indicate when life begins. 124 Article 4
of the American Convention protects life from the moment of conception. 125 In
submitting the Convention for Senate consideration, however, President Carter
explicitly proposed a reservation to that provision. 126 The attorneys who pre-
sented this case to the Inter-American Commission could not have reasonably
believed that such a controversial and extraordinarily attenuated case would be
the occasion for the Commission to determine, for the first time in its history, that
the United States was in violation of its international human rights obligations
within the Inter-American system. 27
120. Telephone conversation with Jeffrey Peck, Washington, D.C. (May 1984). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Tel-Oren. 53 U.S.L.W. 3612 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985) (No. 83-2052).
121. Case 2141, supra note 115, at 25-26.
122. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in
Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 19, OAS
DOC. OEA/SER.I/V/1I.60, doc. 28, rev. 1 (1983). [hereinafter cited as American Declaration]. By
participating in the adaption of the Declaration the U.S. has agreed to be bound by it. See INTER-
AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11l, at 189 (summarizing the U.S. Government
memorandum in Baby Boy).
123. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.L./V/1I.23 doc. rev. 2 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Ameri-
can Convention]; see Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights,
in 2 Human Rights in International Law 439, 440 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
124. See American Declaration, supra note 122, at art. 1.
125. See American Convention, supra note 123, at art. 4.
126. Human Rights Treaty, Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb.
23, 1978).
127. Indeed, Case 2141 has established a sufficiently significant precedent to be cited in INTER-
AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note III at 186 (1982). The case is also given
prominent attention in T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 2, at 29-31, 71-76.
See also Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System: The Case of "Baby
Boy," 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 309 (1981). Professor Shelton suggests that the Inter-American Commission
might have sought the advice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on this case. Id. at 316.
She admits that the result was "arguably correct," but criticizes the reasoning of the Commission. Id.
at 310. While human rights scholars might want to encourage use of the Inter-American Court,
reference to that court in this case would only have compounded the risks of this "bad case" making
"bad law."
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In both of these cases, the plaintiffs had virtually no chance of succeeding with
their claims. While the plaintiffs had nothing to lose by bringing the case or
making the appeal, the harm done to other potential plaintiffs was significant.
The broad precedent set in these cases prevents other plaintiffs from making
claims which might have a greater chance of success.
When such a situation arises, an attorney is confronted with several difficult
questions. She must consider whether she has an ethical obligation only to the
immediate client or whether the interests of others may be taken into account. Is
there an ethical obligation to pursue all avenues of review for the client, even
when the attorney knows that there is a high probability of defeat if the case is
pursued further? Conversely, does the lawyer have any obligation to other liti-
gants with similar claims which would be adversely affected if a regressive
precedent is established? Should the victories of clients and attorneys be meas-
ured in terms of the building of legal institutions and precedents or in the success
of individual claims?
B. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility: Zealous
Representation
The Model Code requires that a lawyer stay within the bounds of the law.2 8
Disciplinary Rule 7-102 describes the bounds of the law for an attorney. It states:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense. . . when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another. 129
Moreover, a lawyer may not advance an unwarranted defense which cannot be
supported by a good faith argument, knowingly make a false statement of fact, or
conceal or assist in conduct that the attorney knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 130
The Model Code fails, however, to define explicitly what constitutes zealous
representation. Disciplinary Rule 7-101 states under the heading of "Represent-
ing a Client Zealously":
(A)A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(i) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available
means ....
(B)ln his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert a right or position of his client."'
128. CPR Canon 7.
129. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(1).
130. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(2)-(7).
131. Id. at DR 7-I01(A)(1), (B)(1).
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In the situation described above, does DR 7-101 allow an attorney to inform her
client that she is not going to pursue the claim any further when in the attorney's
professional judgment there is a high probability of losing the case, and a nega-
tive decision would adversely affect other potential litigants and sensible devel-
opment of the law? A broad interpretation of DR 7-101 would permit a lawyer to
take this action.
Ethical Consideration 7-5 supports this position. It states:
A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional
opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on
the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such a
decision. He may continue in the representation of his client even though his client
has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the
lawyer.... 32
EC 7-5 states that an attorney may continue in the representation of her client. It
does not say an attorney must assert a claim on behalf of her client. By negative
implication, these two provisions seem to permit an attorney to fail to assert the
claim, or fail to seek further judicial review, and discontinue representation.
A stricter interpretation leads one to the opposite conclusion. DR 7-101(B)
allows a lawyer, where permissible, to exercise her professional judgment to
waive or fail to assert a right or position of a client. This rule may be interpreted
to permit a lawyer not to assert a claim if the client does not wish the claim to be
pursued. It may not apply where the client wishes to pursue a precedent-setting
decision. Moreover, DR 7- 101(A) requires a lawyer to seek the lawful objectives
of the client through reasonably available means. By failing to seek judicial
review or some precedent-setting decision, a lawyer may be violating this rule-
especially when his client wishes to pursue the matter.
Even if the strict interpretation is adopted, a lawyer is not required to seek an
objective which she believes may set a bad precedent. EC 7-8 encourages a
lawyer to inform the client of all relevant considerations. It states:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. . . . A lawyer
should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer
should bring to bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his experi-
ence as well as his objective viewpoint. . . . He may emphasize the possibility of
harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally permissible
positions. "I
It is clear that a lawyer may inform the client of potential consequences to other
potential litigants and the development of the law.
If a client still wishes to pursue his claim, toe lawyer can withdraw from the
case. This approach is the preferred resolution of the problem under EC 7-8 and
132. Id. at EC 7-5 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at EC 7-8.
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would be permitted under DR 2-110(c)(1)(e)13 4 so long as the decision is made
before the claim is filed or review is sought, and not while the parties are in the
midst of an adjudicative proceding.
C. The Rules of Professional Conduct: Reasonable Diligence
Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules states that a "lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 135 The Comment to Rule 1.3
defines reasonable diligence as acting "with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." 13 6 The
use of the term "zeal" may return us to the same analysis as that for DR 7-101. If
the Model Rules define "reasonable diligence" as equivalent to "zealous repre-
sentation," the lawyer will have the same difficulty with the Model Rules as with
the Model Code in deciding whether or not to pursue a claim or judicial review
for a client. The Model Rules, however, include other provisions which indicate
that the analysis should not be identical to the analysis of the Model Code. These
provisions indicate that a lawyer may inform his client that he will not pursue the
case because of the high probability of losing and the adverse affect on future
litigants.
The Comment to Rule 1.2 states that "a lawyer is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do
so."1 37 The Comment to Rule 1.3 also gives support to the attorney who does not
wish to appeal a case with a high probability of losing. It states that "a lawyer is
not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A
lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter
should be pursued." 
3
1
Rule 1.16 of the Model Rules permits an attorney to withdraw from a case if he
does not wish to file a claim or pursue judical review. It states:
(b) ... a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interest of the client, or if:
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repug-
nant or imprudent. 139
A lawyer can convincingly argue that pursuing a claim or appealing a case which
has a high probability of failure and which may adversely affect other litigants,
would be in clear disregard of the interests of other potential litigants, and thus
134. Id. at DR 2-11O(C)(I)(e).
135. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3.
136. Id. at Rule 1.3 comment (emphasis added).
137. Id. at Rule 1.2 comment.
138. Id. at Rule 1.3 comment.
139. Id. at Rule 1.16 (emphasis added).
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imprudent or repugnant. In this context, a lawyer may withdraw from the case
even if the interests of his client might be adversely affected.
D. Conclusion
This analysis does not establish that a lawyer has a duty to abstain from
pursuing a case which has a small chance of success, which may adversely affect
other clients, or which may have a detrimental effect on the progressive develop-
ment of the law. This section has argued, however, that a lawyer has a choice
under the Model Rules and probably also under the Model Code. At minimum, a
lawyer has an obligation to explain to the client the consequences of pursuing a
case, the likelihood of failure, the implications for the development of the law,
and the impact on other prospective litigants. For example, in a test case, a
lawyer should inform his client that if the case is lost, the client will become
rather infamous-at least in the relevant community and law school casebooks.
Indeed, the client might be told that if he insists on pursuing a claim such as those
brought in Tel-Oren or Baby Boy, his case may become the Dred Scott'40 of
international human rights law. The client should have an opportunity to make an
informed decision whether to pursue the matter. If, after he has been fully
informed of the possible ramifications of his appeal, the client still wishes to
pursue the matter, the attorney may withdraw from the case. The CPR limits
withdrawal to situations where the case is not currently before a tribunal. The
Model Rules would permit withdrawal in a broader range of situations.
V. CONCLUSION
International human rights lawyers often face practical and ethical problems
that do not confront their colleagues who work in the international commercial
world. These unusual challenges should be squarely faced. The ethical precepts
discussed in this article provide initial guidance for the U.S. lawyer practicing
international human rights law. Nevertheless, the ethical precepts of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct were not designed for the unusual environment that human rights lawyers
encounter as international trial observers or as advocates in international human
rights procedures. Hence, the lawyer must extrapolate and interpret by analogy
from the Model Code and the Model Rules in order to obtain useful guidance.
140. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
